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In this Reply Brief, Appellants Deveaux and Marjorie Clark ("Clarks") will address
five arguments raised by Deloitte & Touche, LLP ("Deloitte") in its Opposition
Memorandum}
UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE CLARKS' TAX LIABILITY BECAME FIXED,
THEY HAD ONLY AN "INCHOATE" OR CONTINGENT WRONG THAT WAS
NOT AN ACTIONABLE. LEGAL OR REDRESSABLE INJURY
Deloitte argues that in Utah "the general rule is that a negligence action accrues when
the negligence occurs . . . " (Deloitte's Br., p. 6). That is an incorrect statement of the law.
A cause of action accrues when the plaintiff could have first filed and prosecuted his or her
lawsuit to a successful completion. Meyer v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981).
Moreover, "accrual" as that term is used with regard to an event triggering the
commencement of a statute of limitations is not merely the point in time a person first
realizes that there has been a breach of duty owed to him or her by another. There must also
be "actionable," "legal," or "redressable" injury. Whether one uses the term "actionable
injury," "legal injury," or "redressable injury," the concept is one of "ripeness."

1

It is Appellants' belief that Deloitte's other arguments do not merit a response since
they are obviously flawed. Deloitte, for example, contends that "as a practical matter, a
plaintiff rarely, if ever, would need to prosecute its tax claim and its malpractice action
simultaneously" because a taxpayer could enter into a tolling agreement with the accountant
until the Tax Court decided the case. (Deloitte's Br., pp. 18-19). But that is pure
speculation on the part of Deloitte unless Deloitte is conceding that it would readily have
given such a tolling agreement to Appellants. If that is so. then Deloitte would certainly
have never moved to dismiss the Clarks' claims based upon the statute of limitations, which
it did. Additionally, Deloitte ignores the fact that when it repeatedly advised the Clarks to
"contest" the IRS tax deficiency assessment and the Clarks relied upon that advice. Deloitte
tolled the running of the statute of limitations. See infra at page 22.
1

An actionable injury, legal injury, or redressable injury is some cognizable and
discernable detriment resulting from another's breach of duty for which the injured party can
seek compensation through a court of law. See Winn v. Estate of Holmes, 815 P.2d 1231,
1235 (Okl. App. 1991). Within the factual context of the instant case, the Clarks had no
legally cognizable injury until the Tax Court decision was handed down. Prior to that time,
the Clarks had an "inchoate" or contingent injury which, under Utah law, will neither
support a claim for relief nor trigger the running of the state of limitations. See Seale v.
Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996).
In Seale, the Utah Supreme Court decided whether a deceased plaintiff's medical
malpractice claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in § 70-14-4
of the Utah Code. The defendant doctor in that case had misdiagnosed the deceased
plaintiff's breast cancer. When the cancer was finally discovered approximately one year
later, the patient underwent a radical mastectomy. Three years later, the cancer reappeared
in the patient's left hip and she immediately sued for malpractice. The defendant doctor
argued that the cause of action had actually accrued in 1987 when the misdiagnosis occurred
because the plaintiff had sustained injury in the form of "enhanced risk" of the cancer's
reoccurrence. Emphasizing that the law does not recognize an "inchoate wrong" and that
a claim for negligence is not actionable until there is "actual loss or damage," the Utah
Supreme Court rejected the notion that the patient's claim had accrued in 1987.
The Seale Court went on say that:

2

Our holding that damages in the form of an enhanced risk
only are not sufficient to start the running of the statute of
limitations not only comports with generally accepted
principles of tort law, but also minimizes the filing of
speculative suits thus saving judicial time and resources.
More importantly, any alternative ruling might effectively
preclude a patient from any recovery, even when the significant
harmful effect, such as the reoccurrence of cancer, later occurs
.. .[I]f we were to adopt defendant's position, plaintiffs who
are not exhibiting any actual physical harm but are facing
the running of the limitations period would be forced to
bring an action for injuries that may or may not occur in
the future. However, many of these plaintiffs will be unable to
produce the necessary evidence to show that the future harm is
more likely to occur than not. Yet if the harm, such as the
reoccurrence of cancer, actually later occurs, the plaintiff would
be precluded from any recovery for devastating injuries by
reason of having acquired an earlier claim for purely speculative
ones. We believe that the better approach is to wait until
the potential harm manifests itself, allowing for a more
certain proof and fewer speculative lawsuits.
{Id. at 1365-66) (emphasis added). The same rationale applies to the Clarks' situation.
Unless and until their tax penalties and assessment became fixed by the Tax Court's
decision, their injuries were contingent, inchoate, and speculative and so much so that the
Clarks could not have maintained a cause of action against Deloitte. The Clarks' injuries
were, in other words, not "ripe" for decision. See Colonia Insurance Co. v. Williams, 941
F.Supp. 606, 608 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (holding that so long as a party's claim is subject to or
may be disposed of by another pending proceeding, it is not "ripe" for litigation); Boerger
v. Levin, 812 F.Supp. 564, 565 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that in a legal malpractice action,
the client's claims against the attorney are not
adjudicated).
3
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ripe" until the underlying lawsuit is

Deloitte attempts to get around the reasoning of Seale and the question of "ripeness"
by arguing that the Clarks did in fact sustain actionable, legal, or redressable injury when
they received the IRS 90-Day Letter. Deloitte argues that at this point in time the Clarks
began to incur legal fees in order to challenge the tax assessment and penalty, and that such
fees constitute an actionable injury. (Deloitte Br., p. 10). But that argument is specious.
It is specious because it assumes that upon receipt of the 90-Day Letter, the Clarks could
have sued for and recovered from Deloitte the cost of pursuing their tax appeal, which they
could not have done. Just because a taxpayer is audited does not mean that the tax advice
was below the standard of care. Just because the taxpayer receives a 90-Day Letter does not
mean that the tax advice was substandard. More importantly, unless the tax advice was
below the standard of care, the taxpayer has no right to sue his or her accountant for
recovery of these expenditures. See Bronstein v. Kalcheim & Kalcheim, Ltd., 414 N.E.2d
96(Ill.App. 1980).
Bronstein is a case on point. The only difference between Bronstein and the instant
case being that the defendants in that action were tax attorneys instead of accountants. The
plaintiff in Bronstein sued his attorneys for bad tax advice on a divorce settlement. The
attorneys, who represented themselves as "experts in the field of federal income tax law"
advised Mr. Bronstein that if he labeled the reimbursement of his wife's attorney's fees as
"additional alimony," these payments would be deductible on his federal income tax return.
But the IRS took a different view and disallowed the deduction as a result of an audit.

4

Following that audit, Mr. Bronstein received a 90-Day Letter informing him of the
additional tax assessment.
Bronstein sued his attorneys for malpractice citing as his injuries the burden of either
paying the additional tax or filing a petition in the United States Tax Court to contest the
IRS's assessment of additional taxes owing. The attorneys moved to dismiss and the trial
court granted that motion.

The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that

Bronstein's action was "premature'' because:
The issuance of the notice of deficiency (Le. 90-Day Letter)
does not establish the plaintiff has suffered a loss.
Furthermore, because plaintiff's tax liability has not yet
been determined in the Tax Court, it is clear that plaintiff
has not yet suffered any actual loss.
(Id. at 98) (emphasis added). Like Bronstein's malpractice suit against his tax attorneys, the
Clarks suit against their tax accountants was "premature" until such time as the Tax Court
ruled that the tax advice was "bad" or "unlawful" thereby entitling them to sue for damages
(attorney's fees, penalties, etc.) caused by that advice.
Now Deloitte may wish it to be so, but Bronstein is not an aberration. In fact, when
faced with the same issue (i.e., the accrual of malpractice cause of action when a proceeding
in another forum may be dispositive of the underlying malpractice claim), Courts typically
hold that the malpractice action is "premature," "contingent," or "speculative." See
Boerger, 812 F.Supp. at 565; Bowman v. Abramson, 545 F.Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See
alsoKJ.B. Inc. v. Drakulich,SU P.2d 1305,1307 (Nev. 1991) (holding that when there has
been "no final adjudication" of the matter in which the malpractice allegedly occurred, the
5

element of injury or damage remains "speculative and remote, thereby making premature
the cause of action for professional negligence"); Amfac Distribution Corp. v. Miller, 673
P.2d 792, 794 (Ariz. 1983) (stating that for legal malpractice cases, the injury or damaging
effect on a client "is not ascertainable until the appellate process is completed or waived
by failure to appeal");2 Golden v. Duggins, 374 So.2d 243, 245 (Miss. 1979) ("no injury"
until other action concluded); Marchand v. Miazza, 151 So.2d 372, 375 (La. App. 1963)
("premature" until underlying lawsuit decided since damages are speculative until then);
Wright v. Diabold, 217 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1961) ("premature" because damages are
"contingent" upon outcome of other suit).
The fore°;oin£ case law all involve situations in which the client and victim of le^al
malpractice was attempting to sue his or her attorney when there was another action pending
that would ultimately be dispositive of the alleged malpractice. In each of these cases, the
Appellate Courts concluded that until the underlying lawsuit was decided, the client's claims
were not actionable because they were "speculative," "contingent," or "premature." But
the concept is really one of "ripeness" or justiciability. More importantly, it applies to
situations other than malpractice claims. It applies to every instance in which there is
another proceeding pending which may dispose of a party's claims. See Colonia Insurance,

2

Amfac was apparently cited with approval by the Utah Court of Appeals in Merkley v.
BeaslinJlSP.2d 16,19 (Utah App. 1989). Merkley holds that on a legal malpractice claim,
the cause of action accmes and the statute of limitations commences to run when the act
complained of is discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have been
discovered. (Id. at 17).
6

941 F.Supp. at 608; Aircraft and Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 62 F.Supp. 520, 524
(D. D.C. 1945); Romano v. American Casualty Company, 834 F.2d 968 (11th Cir. 1987).
Other Courts have applied this same "ripeness" reasoning to hold that the client's
cause of action for legal malpractice does not accrue and, therefore, the statute of limitations
does not commence to run until the underlying suit is decided.

See Shaw v. State

Department of Administration, 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 1991); Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d
42, modjied 803 P.2d 205 (1990); Stephens v. CMC, 905 P.2d 797 (Okl. 1995). See also
Boerger, 812 F.Supp. at 566 fn. 4 (noting that until the claim becomes "ripe" after the
underlying lawsuit has been decided, the statute of limitations does not begin to run). The
rationale for concluding that the statute of limitations does not commence to run in legal
malpractice actions until the underlying litigation is finally determined was cogently stated
by the Oregon Supreme Court in United States National Bank v. Davies, 548 P.2d 966
(1976).
In Davies, a malpractice suit was filed against the defendant attorneys to recover
money the client paid in settlement of lawsuit with a corporation in which he was an officer.
The corporation was in the funeral marker or monument business and had on hand customer
trust funds for prepaid funeral related services. The corporation sued the former officer for
having sold his stock to the corporation and accepting those corporate trust funds in payment
for his shares of stock in the corporation, which was illegal. The officer had done this solely
upon the advice of his attorneys, and the malpractice action was commenced to recover the
settlement money and attorney's fees incurred by the client in defending the suit brought by
7

the corporation. The attorneys moved to dismiss arguing that the statute of limitations had
expired and the trial court granted that motion. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court
reversed. In doing so, the Davies Court specifically rejected the notion that incurring
attorney's fees to defend the lawsuit would give rise to "actionable" or "legal" harm when
the underlying malpractice had not been established:
There is no doubt that. . . [plaintiffs] necessity to defend the
action caused him damage more than two years prior to
commencement of the present action. It is not so clear,
however, that at that time it could yet be determined that
his expense of defense was caused by negligent advice by
defendants. In many situations, the closeness of the legal
questions involved would make it impossible to ascertain until
the ultimate determination of the case whether it was brought as
a result of the attorney's bad advice or whether it was a result of
a misapprehension on the part of the party who sued as to his
legal rights. In the present instance, if . . . [plaintiff] had
won the case brought against him, he would not normally be
in a position to claim that negligent advice on the part of the
present defendants was a cause of his expense of defense.
{Id. at 969) (emphasis added). Like Bronstein, Davies also makes clear that even though the
client may have incurred legal expenses as a result of the advice he or she received from an
accountant or attorney, there is no right to sue to recover those expenses unless and until it
is determined that the advice was "bad" or unlawful.3 Again, this is a question of "ripeness"
3

Davies also disposes of Deloitte's argument that even assuming the taxpayer's injuries
do not become actionable until the Tax Court decision, the taxpayer suffers no harm by
making the statute of limitations commence to run upon receipt of the 90-Day Letter since
"a Tax Court decision would typically be issued well prior to the expiration of the
malpractice limitation
" (Deloitte £r. p. 19). Deloitte goes on to argue, for example, that
even if the statute of limitations commenced to run upon the Clarks' receipt of the 90-Day
Letter, they still had 15 months in which to commence their lawsuit following the Tax Court
decision. (Deloitte'si?r., p. 18). This same situation, however, also occurred in Davies. In
8

and that is why Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323 (Fla. 1990) is the
better reasoned case law on accountant malpractice.4
Like the Clarks, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell involved husband and wife taxpayers suing
their accountants for bad tax advice, including the preparation of their federal income tax
return. The accountants in Peat, Marwick, Mitchell had advised the taxpayers to invest in
limited partnerships and to claim deductions for losses incurred by those limited
partnerships. Like the Clarks, the Lanes received a 90-Day Letter from the IRS. The Lanes,

Davies, the advice to sell the stock was given in 1967, the corporation sued the officer in
August of 1971, the settlement occurred in May of 1973, and the malpractice action was
commenced in 191 A. Oregon had a two year statute of limitations on legal malpractice,
which means that from the time the suit was commenced and attorney's fees were incurred
by the officer in defending that suit until the eventual settlement with the corporation, the
two year statute of limitations had not expired. But this was irrelevant to the Davies Court's
decision since the focus is upon when the cause of action accrued. That is the key
determination, because a party is entitled to the full limitation period to investigate, prepare
and bring their action, especially the Clarks who upon the sale of their business retired to
California, which was the state of their residence when the tax return was filed. (Rec. p.
202).
4

Deloitte argues that the fact that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell is the only case to hold that
a taxpayer's cause of action against his or her accountant does not accrue until the Tax Court
decision is rendered somehow makes that decision defective or otherwise suspect. (See
Deloitte's Br., p. 3 fn. 4). Yet that argument ignores the fact that one can find case law to
justify every conceivable date for accrual of a taxpayer's cause of action against his or her
accountant. There are cases which say the cause of action accrues when the bad tax advice
is given or the tax return is filed. Other cases hold that the cause of action accrues when the
taxpayer receives the audit letter. Cases also exist that say the cause of action accrues when
the taxpayer receives the 30-Day Letter and/or 90-Day Letter. (See Appellants' Op. Br., pp.
15-16). But the thing that distinguishes Peat, Marwick, Mitchell from these other decisions,
however, is that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell approached the question from an "actionable
injury" or "ripeness" perspective, which is the same approach taken by the Utah Supreme
Court in Seale. This argument likewise ignores the fact that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell is
consistent with the "ripeness" case law from numerous jurisdictions.
9

also like the Clarks, were advised by their accountants to fight the assessment and they, too,
followed that advice. The IRS eventually prevailed and the Lanes brought a malpractice
action against their accountants, which was dismissed by the trial court based upon the
expiration of the statute of limitations. But on appeal, the Rorida Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court because:
[A] cause of action for professional malpractice does not arise
until the existence of redressable harm has been
established.' . . . The Lanes did not suffer redressable harm
until the Tax Court entered judgment against them. Until
that time, the Lanes knew only that Peat, Marwick might have
been negligent; however, if the Tax Court did not uphold the
deficiency, the Lanes would not have a cause of action
against Peat, Marwick for accounting malpractice.
(Lane v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 So.2d 922,924 (Fla.3d D.C.A. 1989) (emphasis
added). The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Court of Appeals'
ruling.
The issue before the Florida Supreme Court in Peak, Marwick, Mitchell was when
the "redressable" harm or injury occurred. Was it when the Lanes received the ninety day
letter or when the Tax Court Judgment was entered? (565 So.2d 1325). More importantly,
in answering this question, the Florida Supreme Court looked to and was persuaded by the
analogous situation of attorney malpractice:
This situation is not unlike attorney malpractice actions. A clear
majority of the District Courts have expressly held that a cause
of action for legal malpractice does not accrue until the
underlying legal proceeding has been completed on
appellate review because, until that time, one cannot
determine if there was any actionable error by the attorney.

10

Peat, Marwick asserts that any malpractice resulting from the
advice which a professional gives concerning tax matters is
different from attorney malpractice because any cognizable
legal injury with respect to accounting malpractice depends not
upon a determination by a court of law but, instead, upon a
determination by the IRS. Peat, Marwick argues that the Lanes'
cause of action accrued when they received their 'Ninety-Day
Letter from the IRS, reasoning that at that point, the Lanes
have sustained a legally cognizable injury. While Peat,
Marwick maintains that the letter reflected the IRS's conclusive
determination that the Lanes had underpaid their federal income
tax, it acknowledges that the Lanes had the option to pay the
tax owed or to prove that they did not owe the tax by
petitioning for a redetermination of the deficiency in Tax
Court.
{Id. at 1325-26) (emphasis added).
According to the Florida Supreme Court, it was the taxpayer's opportunity to prove
that the tax was not owing that made their malpractice claim not "redressable" or "ripe" for
decision until the Tax Court had ruled:
In this case, the Lanes chose to appeal the IRS's determination
to the United States Tax Court, in accordance with the advice
given them by Peat, Marwick. We find, consistent with the
holdings in numerous attorney malpractice cases, that until
their Tax Court action was final, the Lanes did not have an
action for malpractice. We reject Peat, Marwick's contention
that an IRS deficiency determination conclusively establishes an
injury upon which to base a professional malpractice action. If
we were to accept that argument, the Lanes would have had
to file their accounting malpractice action during the same
time they were challenging the IRS's deficiency notice in
their Tax Court appeal, such a course would have placed
him in the wholly untenable position of having to take
directly contrary positions in these two actions. In the Tax
Court, the Lanes would be asserting that the deduction
Peat, Marwick advised them to take was proper, while they
would simultaneously argue in a Circuit Court malpractice
11

action that the deduction was unlawful and that Peat,
Marwick's advice was malpractice.
To require a party to assert these two wholly inconsistent
positions in order to maintain a cause of action over
professional malpractice is illogical and unjustified. Until
the Tax Court determination, both the Lanes and Peat
Marwick believe that the accounting advice was correct;
consequently, there was no injury.5 To hold otherwise would
mean that an accountant's client would have an action for
malpractice as soon as the client received a 'Ninety-Day Lettef
from the IRS. That result is contrary to common sense and
reason.
{Id. at 1325-26) (emphasis added).
THE UNEQUAL TREATMENT BETWEEN TAX ACCOUNTANTS AND TAX
ATTORNEYS INHERENT IN THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
If the Clarks had received the bad tax advice from a tax attorney rather than a tax
accountant, the case law clearly establishes that their cause of action against the negligent
attorney would not have accrued until the Tax Court decision became final. The Clarks
argued before the District Court that case law developed in this analogous area of attorney
malpractice should govern in this situation and they even referred the District Court to that
case law. {Rec. pp. 247 and 308). The District Court, however, rejected that argument, and
in doing so arbitrarily and capriciously treated victims of accountant malpractice differently
5

The Peak, Marwick, Mitchell holding is also consistent with the "discovery rule"
articulated for legal malpractice by the Utah Court of Appeals in Merkley, 778 P.2d at 17,
which is a factual inquiry case specific. Both the Lanes and the Clarks had no way of
knowing that the tax advice was "unlawful" until they received a determination to that effect
from the Tax Court. Prior to that point in time, any position they took with respect to the
validity of the advice they had received from their respective accountants would have been
speculation.
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than victims of attorney malpractice. Consequently, the Clarks argued in their Opening Brief
that in doing so, the District Court's decision was in fact a violation of the Clarks' due
process and equal protection rights. (Appellants' Op. Br., pp. 22-23). Deloitte did not
respond to this argument other than to claim that it should not be considered since it was
never presented to the District Court. (Deloitte's Br., p. 21 fn. 14). Deloitte likewise
suggests that this Court should not consider this equal protection argument since it was not
"adequately briefed" in the Clarks' Opening Brief But Deloitte is incorrect as to both
matters.
While it is true that the Clarks did not use the terms "due process" or "equal
protection" in the Briefs which they filed with the District Court, they did argue the
application of the analogous body of law developed under attorney malpractice, which is all
that is required to preserve for appeal the issue of their "dueprocess" and "equalprotection"
violations occurring as a result of the District Court's rejection of that case law. This is so
because arguments which are not dependent upon new facts and are closely related to and
could have been inferred from a party's contentions before the District Court may be
presented for appellate review. Alaska Marine Pilots v. Hendsch, 950 P.2d 98,109 (Alaska
1997).
With respect to Deloitte's contention that the due process and equal protection
argument was not "adequately brief that, too, is incorrect. The "adequacy" of the briefing
depends upon the complexity or the legal issues involved and the disparate treatment
between tax accountants and tax attorneys inherent in the District Court's ruling is not a
13

matter that requires extensive briefing. Tax accountant and tax attorneys are equally
qualified to provide tax advice and complete tax returns. Consequently, it is unconstitutional
to treat them differently for purposes of limiting their potential liability to their respective
clients. See, e.g., Berry By and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670, 678 (Utah
1985) (setting forth cases in which numerous jurisdictions had struck down statutes of
repose on state and federal equal protection ground because these statutes prohibited suits
against some tortfeasors but not others).
PUBLIC POLICY WEIGHS HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF THE CLARKS'
POSITION THAT THEIR CLAIM AGAINST DELOITTE DID NOT ACCRUE
UNTIL THEIR TAX LIABILITY BECAME FIXED
In their Opening Brief, the Clarks pointed out that if a taxpayer challenging the IRS
additional tax assessment were required to bring a malpractice action against his or her
accountant prior to conclusion of the Tax Court proceeding, it would give rise to a host of
a problems. There would be, for example, the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, a waste
of judicial resources, a difficulty of proof, and the serious evidentiary problems of
contending in a malpractice action that tax advice was below the standard of care while at
the same time asserting before the Tax Court that that same advice was in accordance with
existing tax laws. {Op. Br., pp. 18-22). The Clarks argued, therefore, that when the
taxpayer elects to proceed to litigate the issue of his or her tax liability in the Tax Court, the
better policy is to find that the cause of action does not accrue until after the Tax Court had
fixed the injury. But Deloitte argues that the public policy arguments put forth by the Clarks
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are either incorrect legal assumptions. (Deloitte, Br., pp. 17-21). Once more, Deloitte is
simply wrong on these matters.
With respect to Deloitte's contention that there is no harm or problem with a taxpayer
pursuing at the same time both an action in Tax Court and a claim for accountant
malpractice, that is a problem which numerous Courts have recognized, including the Utah
Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court in Peak, Manvick, Mitchell, for instance, stated
that requiring a taxpayer to simultaneously assert these two legally inconsistent positions in
order to maintain a cause of action for professional malpractice was both "illogical and
unjustified." {Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, 565 So.2d at 1326) (emphasis added). The Oregon
Supreme Court in Davies was even more critical of Deloitte's proposal of simultaneous
lawsuits:
[I]t does not seem wise to encourage the filing of such
provisional actions. More important, it could prove to be a
disaster to a plaintiffs defense of the action brought against
him and, thus, perhaps disastrous to his former legal
advisors as well. In the present case, plaintiffs . . . would
have been defending one suit or action, claiming he had
acted in conformance with the law, while simultaneously
maintaining an action against defendants, claiming that he
had not acted in conformance with the law because of faulty
advice from defendants. Such an inconsistent position
would have given rise to impeachment of.. . [plaintiff] in
his defense of the action brought against him, but certainly
is not desirable from either of the present party's point of
view.
{Davies, 548 P.2d at 970) (emphasis added). The danger of suing on speculative or
premature claims was also one of the factors that apparently influenced the Utah Supreme
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Court in Seale, See 923 P.2d at 1365-66 (discussing the ill effects of requiring injured
parties to sue on premature actions).
Seale holds that damages in the form of a patient's enhanced risk of cancer are not
sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations. The Seale Court characterized this
ruling as not only being consistent "with generally accepted principles of tort law, but
also minimizes the filing of speculative suits, thus saving judicial time and resources."
{Id. at 1364) (emphasis added). The Seale Court went on to consider and reject the
argument by defendants that a medical malpractice plaintiff whose only injury is the risk of
reoccurrence of cancer should sue immediately with the following reasoning relevant to the
Clarks' situation:
[I]f we were to adopt defendants' position, plaintiffs who
are not exhibiting any actual physical harm but are facing
the running of the limitations period would be forced to
bring an action for injuries that may or may not occur in
the future. However, many of these plaintiffs will be able to
produce the necessary evidence to show that the future
harm is more likely to occur than not. Yet if the harm, such
as the reoccurrence of cancer, actually later occurs, the
plaintiff would be precluded from recovery for devastating
injuries by reason of having acquired an earlier claim for
purely speculative ones. We believe that the better
approach is wait until the potential harm manifests itself,
allowing for more certain proof and fewer speculative
lawsuits.
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(Id. at 1365-66) (emphasis added).6 Thus, contrary to Deloitte's suggestion, the policy in
Utah is against speculative suits and needless expenditure of judicial resources.
A HOLDING THAT THE CLARKS' CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ACCRUE
UNTIL THE TAX COURT DECISION WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE POLICY
AGAINST STALE CLAIMS UNDERLYING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Deloitte argues that the fundamental purpose of the statute of limitations is to prevent
litigation of stale claims and that this policy would be grossly violated if, as the Clarks
contend, their cause of action did not accrue until the Tax Court decision became final. To
bolster this argument, Deloitte insists that there was no reason for the Clarks to stop at the
Tax Court level but that they could have and perhaps should have appealed that decision.
(Deloitte Br., p. 2 fn. 1). This argument reflects a very basic misunderstanding of both Tax
Court proceedings and the effects of a judgment handed down by the United States Tax
Court.

6

Deloitte suggests that the proper approach would have been for the Clarks to have filed
a malpractice action while pursing the Tax Court review and then move to stay the
malpractice action until the Tax Court decided the issue of their tax liability. (Deloitte's Br.,
p. 18). While this suggestion may seem plausible, it is not legally sound. It is not legally
sound because one of the crucial elements required for a lawsuit is that "the issues between
the parties must be ripe for decision." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983).
If the issues are not ripe, the District Court must dismiss the lawsuit. See Salt Lake County
v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1996). Unless and until the Tax Court decision was
handed down, the Clarks' claims were not ripe. See Colonia Insurance Co., 941 F.Supp.
at 608; Boerger, 812 F.Supp. at 565. Such a "premature" lawsuit would be, in other words,
subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, which means the District Court would have no
authority to enter a stay. SeeBronstein,4\4N.E2dat9S;K.J.B.,Sll
P.2dat \301;Amfac,
673 P.2d at 792; Golden, 374 So.2d at 245; Marchand, 151 So.2d at 375; Wright, 217
N.Y.S.2dat238.
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The 30-Day Letter and 90-Day Letter which the Clarks received from the IRS were
only that agency's assessment of the Clarks' additional tax liability. This assessment would
not become collectible unless the Clarks waived their right of review, which they did not.
Instead, the Clarks proceeded to try the tax deficiency claim by the IRS before the United
States Tax Court. It is important to emphasize the Tax Court is a "trial court." See Flight
Attendants Against UAL Offset v. C.I.R., 165 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1999). Because it is
a trial court, the Tax Court decides cases on the testimony of witnesses, both fact and expert,
exhibits, etc. Moreover, following such trials, the Tax Court makes findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and enters judgments. See Missouri River Sand Co. v. C.LR., 114 F.2d
334, 337 (8th Cir. 1985). The Tax Court decision becomes a "final judgment" within 90
days after entry unless an appeal is taken. 26 U.S.C. § 7483. An appeal from a Tax Court
decision, however, is a very serious matter for a taxpayer and not one to be taken lightly.
To begin with, like any appeal the potential taxpayer appellant must be concerned
about his or her chances of success. Penalties and interest accrue during the appeal process
and are a part of the judgment if the appeal is unsuccessful. Thus, the taxpayer gains
nothing by appealing an adverse Tax Court decision and losing that appeal. In fact, he or
she is saddled with additional interest on the judgment. Appeals also cost money and, unlike
deep pocket players such as Deloitte, the cost of an appeal is an important factor to the
ordinary taxpayer, especially retired taxpayers like the Clarks. Furthermore, the appeal is
to the United States Court of Appeals and the scope of review before the Court of Appeals
is "in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the District Court in civil
18

actions tried without a jury . . ." 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). Stated otherwise, while the
Court of Appeals reviews the Tax Court's decision on questions of law de novo, the Tax
Court's findings of fact can only be disturbed if they are clearly erroneous. See Smith v.
C.I.R., 926 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1991). This standard and the attendant cost of an appeal
would certainly give a taxpayer pause to consider whether the appeal of an adverse Tax
Court decision would be in his or her best interest. But the taxpayer has added impedance
to carefully consider undertaking the appeal of an adverse Tax Court decision because the
Court of Appeals is empowered "to impose damages in any case where the decision of
the Tax Court is affirmed and it appears that the notice of appeal was filed merely for
delay." (26 U.S.C. § 7482(c)(4)) (emphasis added). It is thus not true, as Deloitte contends
that taxpayers, including the Clarks, could opt to drag out the tax review process with appeal
after appeal. It is similarly not true as, Deloitte contends, that the Tax Court decision is of
no consequence.7

7

Another disingenuous argument put forth by Deloitte is the "windfall" argument which
it raises by implication. The Clarks had a duty to mitigate their damages, which they did by
eventually compromising and settling their tax liability with the IRS for approximately
$65,000.00. (Rec. p. 336). Deloitte suggests that it would be in the taxpayers' best interest
to sue for accountant malpractice before completing their Tax Court challenge because they
might be able to collect the full amount of the assessment from the accountant yet eventually
resolve their tax liability for considerably less, thereby realizing a windfall. (Deloitte Br.,
p. 7 fn. 7). The Clarks dare to say, however, that if they in fact had sued Deloitte and
recovered the full amount of their tax liability which eventually approached $500,000 with
interest (Rec. p. 336) and then settled that liability for $65,000.00, Deloitte would be before
the District Court seeking an amendment to the judgment or other relief. If anything, the
fact that Clarks were eventually able to reduce, post-Tax Court decision, their tax liability
to $65,000 would support an argument that the statute of limitations did not actually
commence to run against these particular taxpayers until they paid the assessment.
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Not only is the Tax Court's decision a binding, final judgment, but this fact clearly
refutes Deloitte's claim that allowing the taxpayer to go through this process results in
presentation of stale claims in violation of the policy underlying the statute of limitations in
which evidence has been lost and witnesses' memories have faded. In this case, Deloitte is
not prejudiced by the lag between when the statute of limitations would otherwise have run
and when this action was eventually commenced. Deloitte knew almost as soon as the
Clarks that there was a problem with both the tax advice and the 1986 tax return. The
Clarks consulted Deloitte's employee, Vernon Calder, on the tax audit and that employee
advised the Clarks to contest the IRS determination because the tax advice was "accurate."
(Rec. p. 188, f 20). Moreover, during this entire tax review process, the Clarks continued
to seek out Calder for advice as to how they should proceed and each time they were
"assured" by Calder that the tax advice and corresponding tax return preparation were
correct and that they should continue to contest the assessment. (Rec. p. 189, f 23).
Additionally, by commencing and continuing the tax review process to and including
a decision by the Tax Court, the Clarks not only preserved the essential evidence in this case,
but that Tax Court decision conclusively established two of the elements which the Clarks
need to prove in order to prevail on a malpractice claim against Deloitte. These elements
are: (1) that the tax advice was "bad" or otherwise inconsistent with the law; and (2) that the
Clarks have been damaged as a result of that advice. Until the Tax Court ruled that the
additional taxes and penalties were owing, Deloitte was free to contend that its advice had
been accurate and consistent with the law. Likewise, until the Tax Court ruled that the
20

additional taxes and penalties were owing, the Clarks' malpractice claim against Deloitte
were not "ripe." Under these circumstances, the policy (avoidance of stale claims) by an
application of the statute of limitations simply does not exist since the crucial evidence was
preserved through the Tax Court trial process.
THE FACT DRIVEN DISCOVERY AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL PRONGS OF
THE DISCOVERY RULE WAS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR DECISION ON A
MOTION TO DISMISS
The discovery rule functions as an exception to the normal application of a statute of
limitation. There are three situations in which the discovery rule applies: (1) when mandated
by statute; (2) when the plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of
the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) when the case presents
exceptional circumstances so that the application of the general rule would be irrational or
unjust. See Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996).
The Clarks concede there is no relevant statute that mandates or requires the
discovery rule be applied in this case. Hence, they are relying upon the last two prongs of
the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations. These last two aspects of the discovery
rule are essentially equitable estoppel, whereby the victim of malpractice claim does not
accrue until he or she discovers both the injury and that the injury is or may be attributable
to negligence and/or a defendant who causes a delay in the plaintiffs bringing of a cause of
action is estopped from relying upon the statute of limitation as a defense to that action. As
is true in all cases of equitable estoppel, for the doctrine to be invoked a plaintiff must show
that, under the circumstances, he or she acted in a reasonable manner. See Warren v. Provo
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City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Utah 1992). More importantly, whether the Clarks
acted reasonably under the circumstances in contesting the IRS's tax assessment or when
they discovered or should have discovered both their injury and the possibility of negligence
are questions of fact for the trier of fact. See Brenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah
1996). This is especially true since the Clarks only embarked upon the tax review process
because of the advice given to them by Deloitte, and other Courts faced with an accountant's
similar advice to "fight" the IRS assessment have found that the statute of limitations is
tolled during the actual review process. See Winn v. Estate of Holmes, 815 P.2d 1231,1235
(Okl. App. 1991) (accountant's advice to taxpayers to protest IRS assessment tolls statute
of limitations); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, 565 So.2d 1326 (holding that because the
accountants had "continued to assert that its advice was correct" the case was clearly
distinguishable from other actions involving accountant malpractice and the statute of
limitations).8 Cf. Day v. Rosenthal 170 Cal. App.3d 1125, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 114-116
8

Advising the Clarks to contest the IRS tax deficiency assessment also raises the
possibility of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, which the Clarks have alleged. (Rec. pp.
190-91, % 26). A fiduciary is a person with a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another.
A fiduciary is in a position to have and exercise, and does have an exercise to influence over
another. A fiduciary relationship implies a condition of superiority of one of the parties over
the other. In a fiduciary relationship, the property, interest, or authority of the other is placed
in the charge of the fiduciary. See First Security Bank v. Banberry Development, 786 P.2d
1326, 1333 (Utah 1990). A fiduciary relationship clearly existed between Deloitte and the
Clarks. See Squyres v. Christian, 242 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (holding that a
public accountant was a fiduciary as a result of, among other things, providing tax advice
to and preparing tax returns for the client). If Deloitte knew that its tax advice to the Clarks
was illegal or otherwise inaccurate, it had a duty to advise them of this fact instead of
recommending that they contest the IRS tax deficiency. Whether Deloitte in fact had such
knowledge requires a factual record that can only be developed through discovery. But if
discovery were to show that Deloitte was aware of its "bad advice" to the Clarks, yet still
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(1985) (a tax attorney's advice to his clients to challenge the IRS assessment tolls the
statute of limitations); Jackson Jordan Inc. v. Lydig, Voitn, Mayer, 633 N.E.2d 627,632 (111.
1994) (equitable estoppel applied to prevent the running of the statute of limitation against
attorney malpractice claims because the attorneys had given "reassurances" to the clients
that the legal advice was sound).9
CONCLUSION
The Court should reject the District Court's determination that the receipt of a 90-Day
Letter is the date on which all taxpayers' claims against their accountants for bad tax advice
accrue. The selection of the 90-Day Letter, especially when the taxpayers are contesting
the additional tax assessment and penalties is inconsistent with holdings in Seale and
Merkley. Rather than a date certain for all taxpayers such as the Clarks, their respective
causes of action could and should accrue at varying dates depending upon the facts involved

told the Clarks to start and continue through the tax review process, this would support a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. More importantly, because the fiduciary's duty of
disclosure is continuing, the Clarks' cause of action would have accrued well beyond the
date of the September 19, 1991, 90-Day Letter. Equally important, the possibility of such
a claim is clearly to the issues involved in this appeal. See Coleman v. Utah State Land
Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (granting of a Motion to Dismiss is only appropriate
if it clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim).
9

Before the District Court, Deloitte attempted to argue that Calder was no longer one of
its employees as of June 1,1987, thereby implying that it could not be charged with Calder's
"bad" advice to the Clarks to contest the IRS assessment. Whether Calder was in fact
employed by Deloitte after that time is properly the subject of discovery and not an issue of
any relevance to the Motion to Dismiss, which is directed at the allegations of the pleading.
Furthermore, even if true, the fact that Calder left Deloitte's employment would not relieve
the latter of responsibility for. his subsequent actions or relieve Deloitte of the duty to correct
misrepresentations either it or its employees had made to the Clarks. See Restatement
{Second) Torts, §551(2)(c).
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in each case. If, for instance the taxpayer accepts the assessment upon receipt of the 30-Day
Letter, his or her cause of action accrues at that point in time. But so long as the taxpayer
is challenging the legality of the IRS assessment, the claims are not ripe, and the statute of
limitations does not commence to run. In the case of the Clarks, their claims did not accrue
and the statute of limitations did commence to run until the Tax Court decision became final.
But even if a taxpayer's claims against his or her accountant are determined by this Court
to automatically accrue upon receipt of the 90-Day Letter, the statute of limitations was
tolled in this case by Deloitte's advice to the Clarks to contest or fight that assessment. For
these reasons, the District Court's dismissal of the Clarks' Amended Complaint with
prejudice should be reversed and this matter should be remanded to the District Court for
further proceedings. In the alternative, this matter should be remanded to the District Court
with instructions to made a determination as to when the cause of action accrued10 and the
10

Deloitte argues that the District Court did identify a specific date on which the Clarks'
claims accrued. (Deloitte's Br. p. 22). According to Deloitte, this determination was made
when the District Court stated that "although the Plaintiffs' claims may have accrued much
earlier, for purposes of this Motion, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims accrued at the
latest in September, 1991, when the Plaintiffs received the statutory notice of deficiency
from the Internal Revenue Service." {Mem. and Order at 4-5). But there are several things
wrong with this contention. To begin with, the Memorandum Decision and Order was
prepared by Deloitte's counsel {Rec. p. 294) and signed without change by the District Court
over Clarks' objection. {Rec. pp. 304-310,353-360). That was improper and it makes those
findings Deloitte's rather than the District Court's. See Everaard v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co., 842 F.2d 1186, 1193 (10th Cir. 1988) ("when the District Court adopts a
party's proposed findings of fact wholesale or verbatim, resulting findings are not the
original product of a disinterested mind"). Furthermore, if the District Court did in fact find
that the receipt of the 90-Day Letter was the moment at which the Clarks' claim against
Deloitte accrued, such a finding is arbitrary and not supported by the evidence. There is
nothing in the District Court's Memorandum and Order nor in the factual record before the
District Court to distinguish the date of the 90-Day Letter from any other of the possible
24

both before the District Court through post-judgment Motions and, if unsuccessful, on
appeal. Finally, the Clarks request such other and further relief as to this Court seems just
and merited under the circumstances.
DATED this 23rd day of February, 2000.
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nothing in the District Court's Memorandum and Order nor in the factual record before the
District Court to distinguish the date of the 90-Day Letter from any other of the possible
dates for accrual of the Clarks' cause of action with the sole exception of the date on which
the Tax Court decision became final.
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